LEGAL MEMOS

Cocoa AG Holdings, LLC v. Schneider (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 980. This is another SLAPP case. In this case a condominium developer brought a cross-complaint in a dispute with the owner of a timeshare interest regarding potential amendments to the governing documents. The parties previously had settled the class action lawsuit brought by the owner which pertained to the management and use of the units. The owner brought the SLAPP motion which was granted and affirmed on appeal with the court finding that the developer’s claims arose from protected activity and also because the litigation related activity included statements to interested persons concerning anticipated lawsuits and became an issue of public concern including statements related to homeowner association management conduct. The developer also failed to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits because the owners alleged breach of the settlement agreement, although relevant, did not provide the owner SLAPP protection and some elements of the claims made were not satisfied.

Willis v. The Walt Disney Company (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1001, is another SLAPP case. The plaintiff was a licensee of a well-known musical band’s trademarks for purposes of live performance, and sued The Disney Company alleging that the defendants had violated unfair competition law and committed fraud by deciding not to book that band for future concerts at the company’s venues and by making false or misleading statements about the band’s agents and about the possibility of hiring the band for performances. Defendant filed a SLAPP motion which the trial court denied, but the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the company’s selection of musical acts was within the scope of conduct protected by the catch all provisions of the SLAPP statute and the company’s selection of musical acts to perform at its theme park concerts was also part of public discussion about a public issue. The company could have therefore reasonably been viewed as undertaking an act in furtherance of the exercise of a protected form of expression in connection with a public issue, specifically whether the band would perform their music at the company’s theme parks. Defendant also satisfied its initial burden of demonstrating that the complaint arose from protected activity under that catch all provision of the SLAPP statute, and the appellate court directed the trial court to determine whether plaintiff had established that her causes of action had minimal merit.

/lsa